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UNITED STATES LITIGATION AND FOREIGN BANK
SECRECY: THE ORIGINS OF CONFLICT
DANFORTH NEWCOMB*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, public attention has focused on conflicts between
American discovery efforts and foreign financial privacy law. One need
only recall the attempts to trace the funds in the Iran-Contra investigation, follow the efforts to locate Ferdinand Marcos's assets, or remember the bruising battle between the United States and Switzerland
over Marc Rich Company's tax liability to see the nature of this
problem.
Much of the frustration arises from the mistaken belief that American and foreign concepts of financial privacy differ so greatly that foreign law inevitably conflicts with the United States' attempts at discovery and investigation. In fact, the two concepts have many
similarities. When a conflict arises, it is usually between United States
procedural techniques and foreign concerns about sovereignty, not a
conflict between American and foreign principles of bank secrecy. As
United States government agencies have begun to realize, the conflict
can be largely avoided through an understanding of the similarities between United States and foreign principles of financial privacy, and the
problems certain United States discovery methods cause abroad. The
best evidence of the better understanding of the nature of the conflict
can be found in recent multinational and bilateral arrangements under
which the United States and other nations harmonize their techniques
for financial investigations.
II.

CUSTOMARY SOURCES OF BANK SECRECY IN THE UNITED STATES
AND ABROAD

A review of the origins of the major foreign bank secrecy provisions and a comparison of those origins with American concepts shows
that United States and foreign bank secrecy have a common basis. In
both the United States and major bank secrecy countries, financial pri* The author is presently a partner of the New York law firm of Shearman & Sterling,
and is Practice Leader of the Financial Services Practice Group in the Litigation Department. The author wishes to thank Ms. Joyce Cohen for her invaluable editorial assistance in the preparation of this article.
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vacy. derives from the need for confidential communications between
customers and bankers, much like the confidential communications between doctors and patients.
To fairly compare American and foreign bank secrecy, one should
study foreign bank secrecy in both common law and civil law countries.
Among civil law countries, Switzerland is the quintessential bank secrecy jurisdiction.' English common law has been a second major
source of bank secrecy, particularly as it has been applied in former2
British colonies that are now prominent in international commerce.
To complete the comparison, one must examine the somewhat fragmentary record that constitutes United States bank secrecy to see its
sources and origins.
A.

Switzerland

Article 47 of the Swiss Banking Code prohibits divulging secrets
entrusted to a person in his capacity as an officer, employee or representative of a bank, the banking commission or an auditing company.3
Enacted in 1934, Article 47 was supplemented and revised in 1971
without changing its basic character. 4 Although a banker's obligation of
secrecy arose in private law and grew from the very beginnings of the
banking industry in Europe in the sixteenth century,5 until 1934 there
was no federal statute on the subject. As part of a general revision of
Swiss banking law in 1934, the Swiss government for the first time incorporated in the federal statutes a provision for bank secrecy, a violation of which was punishable as a crime.'
The bankers' duty of confidentiality in Switzerland is similar to
those of other professionals with an obligation of secrecy such as clergymen, lawyers and physicians.' The similarity rests on the need for
the professional and his client to be able to communicate in confidence
if the relationship is to be effective and, in the end, beneficial for society. 8 Like United States law, Swiss law affords a high degree of protec1.
2.

S. REP. No. 130, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 47 (1985).
See PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE

COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL

AFFAIRS, 98TH CONG., 1ST SESS., CRIME AND SECRECY: THE USE OF OFFSHORE BANKS AND
COMPANIES, 24 (Comm. Print 1983) [hereinafter CRIME AND SECRECY].

3. Meyer, Swiss Banking Secrecy and Its Legal Implications in the United States,
14 NEW ENG. L. REV. 18, 25 (1978).
4. Id.
5. Mueller, The Swiss Banking Secret, 18 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 360, 361 (1969).
6. See Meyer, The Banking Secret and Economic Espionage in Switzerland, 23 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 284, 288-89 (1955).
7. Id. at 290.
8. Note, Secret Foreign Bank Accounts, 6 TEX. INT'L L.F. 105, 116 (1970).
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tion to communications between doctors and patients, and between
clergy and lay persons. In an interesting parallel to United States law,
bankers in certain Swiss cantons do not have the same high level of
legal protection for their communications as doctors or the clergy.10
The Swiss Bankers Association perhaps best summarized the origins of Swiss bank secrecy:
The principle of financial confidentiality was incorporated in
ancient law and was confirmed in medieval times by the civil
codes of German principalities and of the cities in northern Italy. As trade expanded and feudal privileges crumbled under
the increasing struggle for individual rights, confidence in the
discretion of bankers became indispensable for the protection
of private property and the correct conduct of commerce. By
the middle of the 19th century, virtually all the governments of
Western Europe had validated banking secrecy, and comparable legislation has since been enacted in every country concerned with an orderly banking system. Where Swiss law differs from almost every other is in its protection of banking
secrecy by criminal law."
B. England
Eleven years before the Swiss enacted their federal criminal sanctions against violating bank secrecy, three judges in the Kings Bench
Division of the Court of Appeal wrote the seminal decision in the English law of financial privacy, Tournier v.National Provincial and
Union Bank of England" This decision formed the foundation for another great branch of the bank secrecy laws around the world. Its importance has even been recognized by the United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations in that body's report on bank
secrecy jurisdictions. 8 Many former British colonies, such as the Bahamas and Canada, have adopted the common law of England and, along
with it, notions of bank secrecy found in English law. In addition, several banking centers which are regarded as tax havens continue to be
direct colonies or protectorates of Great Britain, notably Hong Kong,
the Cayman Islands, and the Channel Islands.
9. Id.
10. Meyer, supra note 3, at 25; Mueller, supra note 5, at 361.
11. Swiss BANKERS ASS'N, SECRECY IN Swiss BANKING-SEPARATING FACT FROM MYTH
3 (1984) [hereinafter SECRECY IN Swiss BANKING].
12. 11924] 1 K.B. 461 (C.A.).
13. CRIME AND SECRECY, supra note 2, at 184.
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In Tournier, an employee's contract was not renewed when his
bank disclosed that he had failed to honor a check payable to a bookmaker.1" Tournier sued the bank for defamation and breach of an implied contract of confidentiality.1" The jury, after being instructed by
the court on the laws of England with respect to a banker's duty, found
in favor of the defendant.1 6 On appeal, the court reversed and remanded for a new trial, concluding that the lower court's instructions
17
regarding a banker's duty of confidentiality had been incorrect.
The leading opinion by Justice Bankes analyzed the nature of a
banker's duty to his customer, and concluded that the duty arises from
a confidential relationship between the parties.18 Justice Bankes found
that such a banker-customer relationship may be very similar to a doctor-patient or lawyer-client relationship.' 9 The English, like the Swiss,
incorporated into their formal structure of legal authority a pre-existing customary relationship between a banker and his customer. This
relationship was based upon the need for confidentiality if the banking
relationship was to operate effectively and in a socially beneficial way.
C.

United States

A review of the background of the current federal statute clearly
demonstrates the sources of United States financial privacy law. To see
that history in perspective, however, one should look back to 1970,
when the first round of legislative activity was an indirect attack on
existing United States bank secrecy law. Although there were a few
cases before 1970 which supported bank secrecy, 20 a debate over the
nature of financial privacy in the United States opened with the enactment of federal legislation in 1970.21 Rather than requiring that banks
keep customer records confidential, the new legislation imposed recordkeeping and reporting requirements on bankers for transactions
which would not otherwise create records.2 2 The act, which was primarily designed to facilitate investigation into criminal activity, was some14. [19241 1 K.B. at 462.
15. Id. at 475.
16. Id. at 463.
17. Id. at 461-75.
18. Id. at 475.
19. Id. at 461.
20. See, e.g., Sparks v. Union Trust Co., 256 N.C. 478, 124 S.E.2d 365 (1962); Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 83 Idaho 578, 367 P.2d 284 (1961); Brex v. Smith, 104 N.J.
Eq. 386, 146 A. 34 (1929).
21. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1829b, 1951-1959 (1982).
22. Id. § 1829b(f).
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what ironically entitled the Bank Secrecy Act.'8 Its stated purpose was
"to require the maintenance of appropriate types of records by insured
banks in the United States where such records have a high degree of
usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations or proceedings." 4 This statute has recently given rise to the expanded federal
requirements for currency transaction reporting, and is a key element
in the United States government's efforts to detect so-called "money
laundering."'
The California Supreme Court concluded in Burrows v. Superior
Court" that disclosure of records maintained by a bank concerning a
customer's account was restricted under the California Constitution,
which bars unreasonable searches and seizures of houses, papers, and
effects.' Thus, on the basis of the depositor's expectation of privacy in
his banking records, which was violated by an unreasonable governmental intrusion, the California Supreme Court suppressed documents
voluntarily turned over to the police by a California bank. One factor
relied on by the court in deciding that a depositor had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in such records was the complicated nature of
the banking process. The court noted that in order to reasonably conduct banking affairs, the customer has to assume that information he
supplies to the bank will remain confidential."
In its decision, the California Supreme Court did not decide the
issue of whether the request that the bank voluntarily turn over the
records violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In discussing that issue, however, the court cited the Fifth Circuit's decision in United States v. Miller,1" which concluded that a depositor's rights in the privacy of his bank records were consistent with
the Supreme Court's decision in California Bankers Association v.
Shultz. 0
Two years later, Miller was reversed by the United States Supreme Court."' Writing for the majority, Justice Lewis Powell reviewed
the recently enacted Bank Secrecy Act and the Court's earlier decision
23. Id. §§ 1951-1959.
24. Id. § 1829b(a)(2).
25. See Enforcement and Utilization of the Bank Secrecy Act: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on General Oversight and Renegotiation of the House Comm. on Banking,
Finance and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1984).
26. 13 Cal. 3d 238, 529 P.2d 590, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166 (1974).
27.

CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13.

28.
29.
30.
31.

13 Cal, 3d at 247, 529 P.2d at 595, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 171.
500 F.2d 751 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
500 F.2d at 756.
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), rev'g 500 F.2d 751 (5th Cir. 1974).
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in California Bankers Association v. Shultz, s concluding that "we
perceive no legitimate 'expectation of privacy' [in the bank records
that were subject to the subpoena]." 8' 8 The opinion stressed that by
turning over his documents and information to a financial institution, a
depositor lacked any legitimate expectation of privacy in that information. 4 Powell cited earlier cases in which the Supreme Court had concluded that where information of a confidential nature is disclosed to a
third party, the expectation of confidentiality is lost. 5 Interestingly, in
discussing these cases, the Court felt it was necessary to exclude from
its consideration so-called "evidentiary privileges," such as the privilege protecting communications between an attorney and his client.8 6
The California Supreme Court and the United States Supreme
Court reached opposite sociological conclusions about bank customers'
expectations of confidentiality in these cases. The important point is
that both courts examined the customary nature of the relationship
between banks and customers. This same analysis was used by the
Tournier 7 court and also forms the basis of Article 47 of the Swiss
38
Banking Code.
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Miller was followed by a limited legislative overruling of Justice Powell's conclusion
as to the expectation of privacy that a United States customer holds
with respect to bank records. Congress established limited statutory
financial privacy six months after the Miller decision was announced
by enacting the Third Party Recordkeepers Act as an amendment to
the Internal Revenue Code.89 This new statute limited the authority of
the Internal Revenue Service to issue an administrative summons for
bank records without notifying the depositor and offering him an opportunity to contest the summons. "' In 1978, Congress adopted the
Right to Financial Privacy Act,'4 1 which made similar confidentiality
provisions applicable to administrative subpoenas issued by federal
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

416 U.S. 21 (1974).
425 U.S. at 442.
Id. at 442-43.
Id. at 443.
Id. at 443 n.4.
Tournier v. Nat'l Provincial and Union Bank of Eng., [1924] 1 K.B. 461, 462

(C.A.).
38. This provision reaffirmed the long standing protection of privacy in banking established by the Swiss Civil Code, the Code of Obligations, and the Penal Code. Meyer,
supra note 3, at 24-27.
39. I.R.C. § 7609 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
40. Id. § 7609(b).
41. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (1982 & Supp. I 1983).
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agencies, with certain limited exceptions. 2
In effect, Congress determined that the depositors' expectations
were similar to the expectations of patients speaking to their doctors or
clients writing to their lawyers." Accordingly, Congress concluded that
such information should be protected from unwarranted invasions by
investigative authorities.""
This brief review of the history of the enactment of limited financial privacy statutes indicates that the origins of financial privacy in
the United States, Switzerland and England are similar. In each country, the law followed the custom and practice of the industry in adopting the provisions for financial privacy, as the law was based on the
confidentiality a bank's customer expects as a matter of custom and
usage. This is true whether it is statutory law, as in Switzerland and
the United States, or common law, as in England. The source of law in
each case was the banking profession's custom of holding the information derived from transactions of bank customers confidential.
III.

SIMILARITIES BETWEEN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN BANK SECRECY

EXCEPTIONS

An examination of the major foreign secrecy provisions suggests
that they have many of the same limitations and exceptions found in
financial privacy laws in the United States. Three areas of recurring
conflict exist between bank secrecy and the efforts to access bank information: criminal investigations, customer consent, and tax investigations. A comparison of United States and foreign law on these three
points shows clear similarities.
A.

United States Exceptions to Secrecy

American case law on bank secrecy and financial privacy was
largely scattered and poorly developed prior to the Supreme Court decisions and the enactment of federal legislation described in the previous sections. A selective review of those cases suggests that American
concepts of financial privacy and bank secrecy are, in some cases, more
restrictive than those of foreign jurisdictions.

42. Id. § 3402.
43. See generally H.R. REP. No. 1383, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1978) (the fourth
amendment does not prevent legislative establishment of unconstitutional privacy
rights).
44. Id.
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1. Criminal Investigations
In an early case, a New Jersey court restrained a prosecutor's investigation into the records of a bank depositor, citing the authority of
various fourth amendment cases with respect to unreasonable searches
and seizures.' The court concluded that until the prosecutor had sufficient evidence to impanel a grand jury and issue a subpoena, it was
improper for a bank to permit the inspection of the bank records of
various policemen suspected of corruption.4 This case is notable not
only as an early statement of American bank secrecy law, but also for
the narrow scope the court permitted for criminal investigation.
2.

Customer Consent

In 1961, the Idaho Supreme Court upheld an action for breach of
an implied contract against a bank for disclosing account information
without the customer's approval. 47 The court concluded that unless
disclosure is authorized by law or the customer, the bank must be held
liable for breach of its implied contract of confidentiality."' In discussing the nature of the relationship between a banker and his customer,
the court found that, as to information, the relationship is one of agent
and principal. 9 Having reached this conclusion, the court held that
there was an action against the bank on an implied contract theory if
the bank disclosed information regarding an account without the customer's consent.50 This case addressed the nearly universal exception
to bank secrecy of customer consent, an exception which has become
particularly significant in recent cross-border disputes over American
efforts to penetrate foreign bank secrecy. The two federal statutes, the
Right to Financial Privacy Act and the Third Party Recordkeepers
45. Brex v. Smith, 104 N.J. Eq. 386, 389-90, 146 A. 34, 36 (1929).
46. Id. at 391, 146 A. at 36.
47. Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 83 Idaho 578, 588, 367 P.2d 284, 290 (1961).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 586, 367 P.2d at 289.
50. The opinion also considered the seminal article by Samuel D. Warren &"Lewis D.
Brandeis on the right to privacy. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
RFV. 193 (1890). The article discusses the nature of the common law protection against
unwarranted invasions of privacy and concludes that one might analyze the matter as an
issue of implied contract as later bank secrecy cases do. The article went on to describe a
separate analysis of a new right to privacy. It did not address protection of financial
information or consider the banker's duty to hold customer information in confidence.
Seventy years later, Professor Prosser attempted to classify and describe the various elements of the privacy right. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960). In doing so he
cited, but did not discuss at length, Brex v. Smith, 104 N.J. Eq. 386, 146 A. 34 (1929),
the early New Jersey bank secrecy case. Prosser, supra, at 390.
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Act, are premised on the idea that customers may consent to disclosure. Without
such consent, investigators must show that the inquiry is
51
appropriate.

3. Tax Investigations
The third major area of conflict in bank secrecy is tax investigations. This area is the most frequent ground for conflict in cases where
the United States attacks foreign bank secrecy. Even on this issue,
there are American decisions which uphold bank secrecy against tax
investigations despite the constitutional underpinning of the United
States' income tax.5 2 In 1936, a federal court of appeals upheld the issuance of an injunction against the Internal Revenue Service's examination of bank records concerning the customer's tax liability, absent
an allegation of fraud, concealment or wrongdoing of any kind by the
taxpayer.53 The court said, "we regard the searches here asserted as a
violation of the natural law of privacy in one's own affairs which exists
in liberty, loving peoples and nations ... " As was previously noted,
the first federal statutory protection, the Third Party Recordkeepers
Act, reflects a similar concern through its restriction on Internal Revenue Service access to bank records. 5
In summary, cases on financial privacy in the United States have
restricted access to bank information in all three areas of comparison:
criminal investigations, customer consent and tax investigations.
B. English Exceptions to Secrecy
The leading English case, Tournier,6 lists four significant exceptions which have generally been followed in British Commonwealth jurisdictions, either as a matter of case law or in statutes enacted after
the Tournier decision.
According to Tournier, the banker's obligation of secrecy is qualified: "(a) [w]here disclosure is under compulsion by law; (b) where
there is a duty to the public to disclose; (c) where the interests of the
bank require disclosure; [and] (d) where disclosure
is made by the ex'57
press or implied consent of the customer.

51. See Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. § 3404 (1982); Third Party
Recordkeepers Act, I.R.C. § 7609(d)(2) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
52. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.

53.

Zimmerman v. Wilson, 81 F.2d 847 (3d Cir. 1936).

54. Id. at 849.
55. I.R.C. § 7609(d)(2) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
56. Tournier v. Nat'l Provincial and Union Bank of Eng., 11924] 1 K.B. 461 (C.A.).
57. Id. at 473.
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A number of British colonies, or former colonies, adopted statutory bank secrecy. In doing so, they adopted the exceptions, or slightly
modified the exceptions, found in the Tournier case. 8 From the
United States' perspective, the two most notable jurisdictions are the
Bahamas and the Cayman Islands." In each, the statutory schemes
closely follow the exceptions in the Tournier decision.
In the Bahamas, the original act was adopted in October 1965 and
amended in 1980.60 The 1965 version was a comprehensive statute regulating banking and trust companies within the Bahamas. Section 10
prohibited the disclosure of any information relating to any bank customer except "for the purpose of the performance of [a banker's] duties or the exercise of his functions under this Act or when lawfully
required to do so by any court of competent jurisdiction within the
Colony or under the provisions of any law of the Colony.""' While the
1980 amendment repealed Section 10 and substituted a more elaborate
statement of duties, it was not substantially different with respect to
the exceptions to the secrecy rules. 2 Under the amendments there
were essentially five exceptions: 1) for the purpose of performing duties
or functions under the Act; 2) for the purpose of performing within the
scope of a banker's employment; 3) as lawfully required by courts in
the Bahamas or under the provisions of Bahamian law; 4) pursuant to
the rights and duties between a bank and its customer at common law;
and 5) as part of a normal business general credit rating with respect
to a customer.6 s The notable omission of an exception for tax matters
arises from the lack of an income tax in the Bahamas. 4
The Cayman Islands adopted the Confidential Relationships
(Preservation) Law in 1976.5 That statute excluded from its scope: 1)
information obtained in the normal course of business with the consent, express or implied, of the customer; 2) information furnished to
constables investigating offenses committed within the Cayman Islands; 3) information furnished to constables authorized by the government investigating crimes committed outside the Cayman Islands
which, if committed on the Islands, would have been an offense; and 4)
58. S. REP. No. 23, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 16, reprinted in 1983 U.S.
ADMIN. NEWS

CODE CONG.

&

157.

59. Id.
60. Bank and Trust Companies Regulation Act, No. 64 (Bahamas 1965) (amended
1980).
61. Id. § 10(1).
62. Bank and Trust Companies Regulation (Amendment) Act, No. 3 (Bahamas 1980).
63. Id. § 2.
64. S.REP. No. 130, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 59 (1985).
65. Confidential Relationships (Preservation) Law, No. 16 (Cayman Is. 1976)
(amended 1979).
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information furnished to the Financial Secretary or his inspector."
The statute also provided that nothing in it was in derogation of the
Tournier67 decision, which was declared to be applicable to the Cayman Islands." The statute specifically prohibited a bank from giving a
credit reference regarding a customer without first receiving the customer's authorization."
The Cayman Islands statute was amended in 1979.70 In the
amended version of the statute, the prohibition on credit references
was repealed, a procedure for obtaining court authorization for the disclosure of information was added, and the exceptions were restated
and reorganized.7 1 Under the amendment there were six stated exceptions when disclosure could be made: 1) to a professional with the consent, express or implied, of the customer; 2) to a constable investigating an offense within the Islands; 3) to a constable investigating an
offense outside the Islands; 4) to the Financial Secretary or his inspector; 5) to a bank to the extent necessary to protect the bank's interests
against its customer or a third party; and 6) to professional persons,
with the approval of the Financial Secretary, to protect that person or
any other persons against crime. 2
Thus, an examination of two jurisdictions which follow Tournier"
demonstrates that bank secrecy, based on English common-law principles, has a number of exceptions which parallel the exceptions developed in United States common law. In fact, at least two United States
cases which considered the Tournier decision criticized it for containing too many exceptions. In a decision just one year after Tournier,the
New York State Supreme Court cited Tournier in dictum, but noted
that the English Court of Appeal had sustained a claim for an implied
agreement on the part of the bank to keep depositors' affairs a secret
"but coupled it with serious qualifications. 7 4 In 1979, the Maryland
Court of Special Appeals gave a more careful consideration to the
Tournier decision and other American cases on the banker's duty of
confidentiality. The court rejected the Tournier "fourfold classification
66. Id. § 3(2).
67. Tournier v. Nat'l Provincial and Union Bank of Eng., [1924] 1 K.B. 461 (C.A.).
68. Confidential Relationships (Preservation) Law, No. 16 (Cayman Is. 1976)
(amended 1979).
69. Id. § 4(5).
70. Confidential Relationships (Preservation) Law, No. 26 (Cayman Is. 1979)
(amending Confidential Relationships (Preservation) Law No. 16) (Cayman Is. 1976).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Tournier v. Nat'l Provincial and Union Bank of Eng., [1924] 1 K.B. 461 (C.A.).
74. M.L. Stewart & Co. v. Marcus, 124 Misc. 86, 92, 207 N.Y.S. 685, 691 (Sup. Ct.
1924).
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of qualifications to the implied contractual obligation of confidentiality
owed by a bank to its depositors... because we believe that [Tournier
'
confers] upon a bank entirely too much discretion." "7
C.

Swiss Exceptions to Secrecy

Perhaps even more than common-law bank secrecy, Swiss bank secrecy presents the appearance of legal impenetrability for many Americans. Once again, however, an examination of the legal authority for
Swiss bank secrecy shows no such situation exists, or has existed, since
the adoption of the Swiss law. The most extensive and scholarly discussion of the exceptions under Swiss bank secrecy is found in an article by Maurice Aubert, one of the leading authorities on Swiss secrecy.7 1 Professor Aubert points out that Swiss bank secrecy is no
impediment to creditors seeking information or attachment, to heirs
seeking the estates of the decedent, or in criminal proceedings for
crimes recognized in Switzerland.7 In certain Swiss cantons, bankers
and other professionals are excluded from testifying in civil trials, but
in other cantons, the privilege is not recognized. In a few cantons, the
judge has discretion to order bank secrecy lifted depending on the nature of the trial and the importance of the issues." s Swiss policy regarding disclosure of tax information is surprising to many Americans.
Under Swiss law, bank secrecy may be invoked against fiscal and tax
authorities calling for the production of certain information. If, however, the taxpayer submits false, forged or inexact financial documents
with the intention of avoiding the payment of tax, he is guilty of tax
fraud under Swiss law. In those circumstances, bank secrecy is not a
79
shield.
Although these exceptions to Swiss bank secrecy have been elaborately and carefully delineated in Professor Aubert's article, they are
not new to the scholarship on Swiss bank secrecy. They have been dis75. Suburban Trust Co. v. Walker, 44 Md. App. 335, 343, 408 A.2d 758, 764 (Ct. Spec.
App. 1979).
76. Aubert, The Limits of Swiss Banking Secrecy Under Domestic and International Law, 2 INT'L TAX & Bus. LAw. 239 (1984).
77. Id. at 278-81. Swiss law, in fact, places bank secrecy on a lower plane with respect
to the right to refuse to furnish evidence than many other professions. In a criminal
proceeding, a clergyman, lawyer, notary public, doctor, pharmacist, mid-wife, and those
who assist such professionals may refuse to give evidence. Bankers, however, are not
included in this list of persons. Schweizerisches Strafgesetzbuch [STGB] art. 77 (Switz.);
Systematische Sammlung des Bundesrechts [SR] art. 312 (Switz.).
78. Meyer, supra note 6, at 292.
79. Aubert, supra note 76, at 280; see also X. and Y-Bank v. Swiss Federal Tax Administration, 76-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) V 9452 (1976).
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cussed in several American articles.8 Moreover, the Swiss bankers
themselves have publicized the exceptions. In a number of articles and
publications, prominent Swiss bankers, the Swiss Banking Association,
and academics writing under the sponsorship of Swiss banks have all
noted the various exceptions to Swiss bank secrecy, including the availability of information in Switzerland to foreign authorities in certain
circumstances.8 1
From this survey, it can be seen that American notions of the
proper exceptions to bank secrecy are surprisingly similar to the exceptions found in jurisdictions following the Tournier82 precedent and in
the Swiss law of bank secrecy. In both the United States and abroad,
criminal proceedings, customer consent, and, at least in limited instances, tax fraud, are proper bases for requiring a banker to disclose
information about his customer's transactions. This conclusion suggests that when American proceedings seek financial information from
abroad, the inquiry should be met with relative sympathy and ease of
execution.
In the history of American cross-border subpoenas for bank information, the opposite has been the case. American litigation is frequently frustrated or made more difficult by foreign financial privacy.
Foreign participants or witnesses in United States matters are often
amazed and dismayed to find the American attitudes toward financial
privacy are at odds with the procedures familiar to those living abroad.
This conflict can only be understood if one looks briefly at the history
of foreign reaction to American discovery efforts and the development
of American legal reaction to foreign restrictions on these efforts. From
an understanding of those reactions, a better appreciation of the current trend in United States law can be gained.
IV.

REACTION ABROAD TO UNITED STATES DISCOVERY TECHNIQUES

A detailed history of United States methods of gaining access to
information outside the territorial limits of the United States is be80. See Meyer, supra note 6, at 293-300; Meyer, supra note 3, at 29-35; Note, The
"Secret" Swiss Bank Account: End of an Era, 38 BROOKLYN L. REV. 384, 388-93 (1971);
Comment, Swiss Banks and Their American Clients: A Fading Romance?, 3 CAL. W.
INT'L L.J. 37, 47-52 (1972-73). These exceptions have also been noted by United States
courts. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings (United States v. Field), 532 F.2d 404, 408 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976).
81. SECRECY IN Swiss BANKING, supra note 11; H. SCHULTZ, BANKING AND MUTUAL
ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS 10 (Swiss Bank Corp. 1983); see also Aeppli, U.S.Swiss Banking Relationships Have A Long Past, Am. BANKER, Jan. 28, 1983, at 10; Swiss
BANKING CORP., FACTS ABOUT Swiss BANKING 4 (1983).
82. Tournier v. Nat'l Provincial and Union Bank of Eng., [1924] 1 K.B. 461 (C.A.).
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yond the scope of this article. It is useful, however, to briefly survey
some of the most salient examples of that history in order to see the
consequences of the United States' coercive techniques for penetrating
foreign bank secrecy.
Early on, the United States courts recognized and encouraged the
use of letters rogatory as a procedure for gaining access to information
located outside the territorial jurisdiction of American courts. From
the earliest days of the federal judicial system, letters rogatory were
used to obtain documents and witness testimony located in other nations. 3 The significant feature of letters rogatory is, of course, that
they are transmitted from judicial or other authorities in the United
States to governmental authorities in foreign nations. Inherent in such
a system is a recognition that the request will be limited by the practices, procedures and concepts acceptable to the foreign authority. 4
This limitation insures that no conflict will arise between United
States inquiries and foreign privacy laws.
A.

Early Conflicts

The first chronic conflict between American methods of investigating litigation facts and foreign notions of the proper scope of such investigations can be found in the enforcement of the United States' antitrust laws. Particularly in the early 1960s, American notions of
antitrust jurisdiction, including the so-called "Effects Doctrine," were
in conflict with commercial interests and jurisprudence of a number of
our major trading partners.8 5 This conflict was clearly seen in the
struggle between the American investigators seeking information and
the foreign witnesses who would not provide the information sought.
The American technique often was to impanel a grand jury and issue
subpoenas to those who had a presence in the United States and control over information outside the United States. There was significant
litigation over the scope of these investigations.8 United States courts
were generally sympathetic to the investigator's concerns and therefore
enforced the investigative subpoenas to obtain information concerning
activities outside the United States.
Foreign reaction predictably came in the form of legal constraints
and impediments to such investigations. Most importantly, several
83. Cf. Nelson v. United States, 17 F. Cas. 1340 (C.C.D. Pa. 1816) (No. 10,116).
84. Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Criminal Matters,
opened for signature Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444, 847 U.N.T.S. 231,
reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 1781 (1982).
85. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
86. See supra notes 81-84.
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governments enacted statutes, referred to as "blocking statutes," that
prohibited the transfer of information to the United States pursuant to
the investigative techniques that were thought to be offensive." Blocking statutes have a different purpose than financial privacy or secrecy
provisions, and therefore raise a significantly different type of problem
under international law. Secrecy and privacy statutes are essentially
designed to protect the interests of the customer. 88 Blocking statutes,
on the other hand, protect the interests of national sovereignty, and
prohibit techniques of investigation or certain actions by foreign governments in the territory of the nation adopting the blocking statute.89
Because interests protected by such statutes are not individual but national, their impact is often not within the control of the individual
90
who is the subject of the investigation and may not be waived by him.
B.

The Rise of Blocking Statutes

Two United States antitrust investigations, which had profound
international ramifications, precipitated two waves of foreign reaction
directed specifically at frustrating United States investigative techniques. The first investigation, which involved the shipping industry,"
led to blocking laws in England and the Netherlands, two nations that
had significant economic and sovereign interests that were affected by
the United States' shipping investigations.9 2
3
The second investigation was the Uranium Cartel Litigation."
Like the shipping investigation, the efforts by those engaged in American litigation to obtain information outside the United States generated significant litigation and disputes over the propriety of such efforts.9 4 This investigation led to a number of blocking statutes which
addressed the techniques used in the investigation and prohibited the
87. See infra notes 89-97 and accompanying text.
88. See supra section II.
89. Fedders, Wade, Mann & Beizer, Waiver by Conduct-A Possible Response to the
Internationalizationof the Securities Markets, 6 J. COMP. Bus. & CAP. MKT. L. 1, 35-39
(1984) [hereinafter Fedders & Wade].
90. Id.
91. In re Grand Jury Investigation of the Shipping Indus., 186 F. Supp. 298 (D.D.C.
1960); see Fedders & Wade, supra note 89, at 36. In 1948, the Canadian Provinces of
Quebec and Ontario enacted limited blocking statutes in response to United States v.
Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
92. See, e.g., Shipping Contracts and Commercial Documents Act, 1964, ch. 87.
93. In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contract Litig., 563 F.2d 992 (10th Cir.
1977).
94. See, e.g., id.; Gen. Atomic v. Exxon Nuclear Co., 90 F.R.D. 290 (S.D. Cal. 1981);
In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. Ill. 1979); see also, Rio Tinto
Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., [1978] 2 W.L.R. 81.
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disclosure of documents pursuant to those techniques."
Since the late 1970s, when foreign statutes were enacted in reaction to the uranium investigation, other United States investigations
using similar techniques have generated reactions in the form of blocking statutes. For example, Canada, which previously had local blocking
statutes, recently adopted a national blocking statute.99 Canada
adopted this statute in response to American treatment of Canadianbased multinational banks in United States investigations into money
laundering activities in the Caribbean.9 7 Many of the major Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) nations have
adopted blocking statutes designed specifically to protect their sovereignty against intrusive investigative techniques. All of these reactions
can be viewed as national efforts to frustrate American discovery and
investigative methods.
These reactions are but one-half of the equation because at the
same time that these statutory reactions were developing abroad,
American law evolved in response to the problems that arose in obtaining information from foreign nations.

V. THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN FOREIGN DISCOVERY TECHNIQUES
As the range and frequency of American litigation with international aspects increased, parties recognized that discovery techniques
based on notions of international comity were insufficient to assure the
broad-ranging discovery traditional in American cases. Initially, techniques developed for obtaining information, other than through letters
rogatory and similar efforts, centered on requiring parties already engaged in American litigation to furnish the courts and their adversaries
with information located outside the United States to which they had
access.
A.

Discovery and Sanctions Against Litigants

A case which clearly illustrates the above method is Societe Internationale pour ParticipationsIndustrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v.
95. Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. 49, § 5(1) (1985); Law
of July 16, 1980, L. No. 80-538, 1980 Journal officiel de la Rpublique francaise [ J.O.]
1799, 1980 Dalloz-Sirey, Legislation [D.S.L.] 285, transl. in 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 382-83
(1981), amending Law of July 26, 1968, L. No. 68-678, 1968 J.O. 7267, 1968 D.S.L. 248
(Fr.); Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch.11, modifying Evidence (Proceedings
in Other Jurisdictions) Act, 1975, ch. 34.
96. Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. 49, § 5(1) (1985).
97. Id.
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Rogers," the most recent United States Supreme Court pronouncement on these issues. In Rogers, a Swiss holding company sought recovery of property held by the Alien Property Custodian under the
Trading with the Enemy Act." As part of the discovery in the case, the
district court ordered the plaintiff to produce records held in its Swiss
bank. 0 0 The plaintiff refused to do so on the grounds of Swiss bank
secrecy. 0 1 The district court, after concluding that the plaintiff had
made a good faith effort to obtain the records but nevertheless had
failed, dismissed the plaintiffs complaint with prejudice.! 2
The Supreme Court carefully reviewed the finding of the district
court regarding the plaintiffs efforts to obtain the documents from
Switzerland. The Court also reviewed the plaintiffs partial success in
obtaining the documents through a combination of permissions by the
Swiss government and waivers by those in Switzerland who had an interest to protect under Article 47 of the Swiss banking law.' Writing
for the Court, Justice Harlan concluded that those efforts were sufficient to assert a claim when balanced against the constitutional rights
of the claimants.10 4 Accordingly, the district court's sanction of dismissing the complaint was too drastic. The Supreme Court reversed
and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. 5
This opinion established a number of doctrines concerning efforts
to obtain documents through the use of the American discovery process. 06 Most importantly, the person with control over the documents
was required to make a good faith effort to remove the foreign impediment to producing them.107 In addition, the Court made careful distinctions between its power to require that documents be produced despite foreign law, and the propriety of imposing sanctions when foreign
law prohibited such production.0 8 Finally, the Court gave great weight
to the criminal nature of the penalty in Swiss law for violating bank
secrecy. The Court suggested that where the penalty was criminal,
United States courts would give extra weight to the impediment of foreign law. 0 9
98.

357 U.S. 197 (1958).

99. Id. at 198-99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 199-200.
at 202-03.
at 203.
at 212.
at 213.
at 197.
at 208-09.
at 205-06.
at 211.
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In following years, particularly for a party to the litigation, courts
were unsympathetic to problems foreign law imposed where the issue
was whether discovery would be permitted rather than whether sanctions would be imposed. 110 As the courts were repeatedly confronted
with the difficult choice between enforcing United States discovery requests or following international comity, they developed additional factors to be considered in discovery disputes. In addition to the good
faith efforts to comply and the clear violations of foreign law found in
the Rogers case, the courts looked at whether: a) the parties seeking
the documents were doing so in a civil or criminal context;. b) there
were substantially equivalent alternative means available for the production of the documents or examination of witnesses overseas; 12 and
c) the foreign government had a substantial interest in the case. 1 s A
number of courts concluded that the proper list of factors was found in
Section 40 of the Restatement (Second) Foreign Relations Law of the
United States, which provides:
Where two states have jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce
rules of law and the rules they may prescribe require inconsistent conduct upon the part of a person, each state is required
by international law to consider, in good faith, moderating the
exercise of its enforcement jurisdiction, in the light of such factors as (a) vital national interests of each of the states, (b) the
extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement actions would impose upon the person, (c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in the territory of the other state, (d) the nationality of the person, and
(e) the extent to which enforcement by action of either state
can reasonably be expected to achieve compliance with the rule
prescribed by that state. 4
Following the Rogers reasoning, a number of courts distinguished
between ordering discovery despite foreign objections and imposing
sanctions for non-compliance. Perhaps the high water mark for the ap110. See Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Finesilver, 546 F.2d 338, 341-42 (10th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1096 (1977). But see Trade Dev. Bank v. Continental Ins. Co., 469
F.2d 35, 41 (2d Cir. 1972).
111. See United States v. Vetco, Inc., 644 F.2d 1324, 1330 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1098 (1981).
112. Id. at 1332.
113. Id. at 1333.
114. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 40
(1965).
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plication of sanctions is found in the Marc Rich case. 115 In Marc Rich,
as part of an investigation into alleged income tax violations by Mr.
Rich and his affiliates, the United States government sought information from companies owned either directly or indirectly by Mr. Rich
and others associated with him. Much of the information that the government sought was in Switzerland, and the bar of Swiss secrecy was
offered as an excuse for not producing the information. After a convoluted history that included the Swiss government's seizure of some
documents and various acts of bad faith on the part of Mr. Rich, a
United States district court imposed a $50,000 per day contempt fine
which was upheld by the Second Circuit. 1 '6 While it is not apparent
from the opinion, this imposition of sanctions is significant because it
arose after the United States had entered into a judicial assistance
treaty and a tax treaty with the Swiss under which so-called "tax
fraud" was properly the subject of international exchanges.117 The
Swiss government's role in the Marc Rich case, both before the United
States courts and in Switzerland, was significant and, in fact, very similar to its activities in the Rogers case.'"
The Marc Rich case may reflect the changing American view of
the balance between foreign secrecy laws and American discovery. At
the time of the Rogers case, the last court to consider the matter, the
United States Supreme Court, found the sanctions inappropriately severe. 11 9 In the Marc Rich case, the last court to consider the matter,
3" 0
the Second Circuit, affirmed the full sanctions imposed below.
B. Non-Party Witnesses
It is not a large step from ordering parties to obtain information
beyond the territorial reaches of the court to ordering non-parties
within the court's jurisdiction to provide such information. Over the
years, American courts have looked with greater skepticism on efforts
to obtain information outside the United States from non-party wit115. In re Marc Rich & Co., 707 F.2d 663 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1215
(1983).
116. 707 F.2d at 670.
117. See Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, May 25, 1973, United
States-Switzerland, 27 U.S.T. 2019, T.I.A.S. No. 8302, at 7; see also Treaty on the Avoidance of Double Taxation, May 24, 1951, United States-Switzerland, 2 U.S.T. 1751,
T.I.A.S. No. 2316.
118. In re Marc Rich & Co., 736 F.2d 864 (2d Cir. 1984).
119. Societe Internationale pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v.
Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 197 (1958).
120. 736 F.2d at 864.
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nesses.' 2' In doing so, the courts have generally considered factors similar to those considered when the discovery is sought from a party,
such as the availability of alternative means, the importance of the information sought, the certainty with which the foreign impediments
are asserted and proved, and the consequences of breaching the foreign
legal impediments in relation to the nature of the dispute being considered in the United States.'22 Shortly after the Rogers2 3 decision was
announced, the First National City Bank of New York was served with
an Internal Revenue Service summons for customer records in its Panamanian branch. The district court modified the summons, and the
court of appeals reversed and remanded the decision to the district
court for further consideration."" The issue was whether the records
were within the control of the bank. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that they were clearly within such control where the
head office sought records from a branch. " ' The court noted, however,
that if production of the records violated the laws of Panama, it should
not be ordered. 2 '
The Second Circuit went a step further in 1960. In Ings v. Ferguson,1 7 the court limited a subpoena served on the New York branch of
a Canadian bank to records found in New York. The court concluded
that ample opportunities existed for the parties seeking the records
from the non-party witness to obtain them through letters rogatory
from the Canadian headquarters of the bank."
In another Second Circuit case,' 2 9 a federal grand jury sitting in
New York served a subpoena on the Chase Manhattan Bank for customer records located in its Panamanian branch. " The bank produced
the records located in New York. During the pendency of the litigation,
in apparent response to the First National City Bank of New York
case, "' Panama adopted a statute making it a misdemeanor to produce
records for use in an action abroad. 32 Judge Leonard Moore, writing
121. See infra notes 121-51 and accompanying text.
122. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
123. 357 U.S. at 197.
124. First Nat'l City Bank v. IRS, 271 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S.
948 (1960).
125. 271 F.2d at 618.
126. Id. at 619.
127. 282 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1960).
128. Id. at 153.
129. In re Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1962).
130. Id. at 612.
131. First Nat'l City Bank v. IRS, 271 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S.
948 (1960).
132. 297 F.2d at 613.
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for the Second Circuit, concluded that in light of the recently adopted
Panamanian statute, records from Panama could not be required to be
produced. 3 The court also said that having officials at the bank's
headquarters in New York order the Panamanian records delivered to
New York for production "would be nothing more than an attempt to
circumvent the Panamanian law."'' The court noted:
Such a maneuver scarcely reflects the kind of respect which we
should accord to the laws of a friendly foreign sovereign state.
Just as we would expect and require branches of foreign banks
to abide by our laws applicable to the conduct of their business
in this country, so should we honor their laws affecting our
bank branches which are permitted to do business in foreign
3
countries.1 5

The court concluded its opinion by quoting from the Ings v. Ferguson
decision: "[U]pon fundamental principles of international comity, our
courts dedicated to the enforcement of our laws should not take such
action as may cause a violation of the laws of a friendly neighbor, or at
the least, an unnecessary circumvention of its procedures."'3 6
By 1976, this strong deference to foreign law when subpoenas were
addressed to non-party witnesses had eroded. In that year, federal authorities conducting an investigation into various tax crimes, served
Anthony Field, a banker working in the Cayman Islands, with a grand
jury subpoena while he was at an airport in Miami, Florida.13

Mr.

Field asserted that he could not respond to the grand jury's inquiries
about the bank customer's transaction without violating the bank secrecy laws of the Cayman Islands, the place of his employment and
residence. " 8 The Fifth Circuit upheld the grand jury subpoena and ordered that Mr. Field comply with the inquiry. " ' The court pointed out
that a nonresident alien could not be compelled to come to the United
States, but if he was in the United States he could be compelled to
testify. "
Six years later, after the United States had made expensive and
only partially successful efforts to pierce Caribbean bank secrecy provi133.

Id.

134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137.

In re Grand Jury Proceedings (United States v. Field), 532 F.2d 404 (5th Cir.),

cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976).
138. 532 F.2d at 406.
139. Id. at 405.
140. Id. at 409-10.
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sions through the courts of the islands," 1 the United States government returned to the service of grand jury subpoenas upon branches of
banks present in the United States as a means of obtaining records
located in foreign bank secrecy jurisdictions. In the first of these cases
to be extensively litigated, the Eleventh Circuit, relying heavily on the
Field case, extended the doctrines of Field to information located
outside the United States.1 ' The court also rejected the bank's argument that the United States ought first to apply for judicial assistance
through the courts of the Cayman Islands,' 4 3 on the ground that this
method was not a substantially equivalent means of obtaining the production of records because of the costs in time and money, and the
14
uncertain likelihood of success. 4
In 1983, the Seventh Circuit in United States v. First National
Bank of Chicago1 4' reached a different result in a case in which the
Internal Revenue Service sought the records of a Greek branch of a
United States bank in violation of Greek bank secrecy. The court remanded the matter to the district court for further findings about the
bank's good faith efforts to obtain waivers.1 46 The Seventh Circuit
noted that its ruling was different in result from the Eleventh Circuit's
147
decision.
In In re Grand Jury Proceedings (United States v. Bank of Nova
Scotia),' the Eleventh Circuit upheld the imposition of coercive sanctions against a bank for failing to produce records from the Bahamas
and the Cayman Islands, despite a foreign court order not to do so.
While the facts in that case are confused by the bank's sloppy search
for records, the court nevertheless concluded, after considering the balancing suggested by Section 40 of the Restatement (Second) Foreign
Relations Law, that the investigative interests of a grand jury outweighed the interests of international comity so as to permit the enforcement of the subpoenas and the imposition of sanctions despite
foreign court orders blocking disclosure.1"
This conflict between the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits as to
sanctions against non-party witnesses seems to have been reaffirmed
141. United States v. Carver, No. 5, Cayman Is. Civ. App. (1982).
142. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia), 740 F.2d
817 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1106 (1985).
143. 740 F.2d at 832.
144. Id.
145. 699 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1983).
146. Id. at 347.
147. Id. at 346-47.
148. 740 F.2d 817 (11th Cir. 194), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1106 (1985).
149. 740 F.2d at 827.
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by the recent district court decision in Laker Airways Ltd. v. Pan Am.
World Airways.150 The court refused to enforce a subpoena on a nonparty witness for documents in London and cited with approval the
earlier Second Circuit decisions.1 51 The court said that these decisions
"continue to reflect the law applicable to non-parties." ' Laker Airways and the other cases discussed suggest that, at least in the Second
and Seventh Circuits, non-party witnesses may stand a somewhat better chance of avoiding coercive sanctions than parties do in the Eleventh Circuit.
C. Securities and Exchange Commission Cases
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has repeatedly
found its enforcement efforts frustrated by foreign secrecy laws. In response to this frustration, its Enforcement Division has used the coercive power of the federal courts against banks to obtain access to customer information. In an early example, a federal district judge
threatened to seize the United States branch of a Swiss bank if the
SEC's agent was not permitted to inventory certain customer assets
held at the bank in Switzerland. 15 8 After the threat, an accommodation
was worked out with the SEC.1 "
In a later case, SEC v. Banco Della Svizzera Italiana,155 the SEC
used similar techniques to obtain access to information in an insider
trading investigation. The Swiss bank acquiesced shortly after a federal district judge informally indicated that he would require the bank
to disclose customer information and impose severe contempt sanctions if the bank did not comply.156
The most creative application of these techniques by the Enforcement Division may be found in the so-called Santa Fe case.1 57 The Enforcement Division named as "nominal defendants" a number of
United States and Swiss banks, in order to obtain the identities of the
banks' Swiss customers who allegedly violated insider trading rules.
As part of its efforts to obtain access to Swiss information during
the Santa Fe investigation, the SEC Enforcement Division began a se150. 607 F. Supp. 324 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
151. Id. at 326 (citing with approval Ings v. Ferguson, 282 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1960);
First Nat'l City Bank v. IRS, 271 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 948
(1960)).
152. Id.
153. Wall St. J., Jan. 7, 1976, at 4, col. 1.

154. Id.
155. SEC v. Banco Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).

156. Id. at 119.
157. Judgement of Jan. 6, 1983, (Federal Tribunal), BGE 109 Ib.

N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & CoMP. L.

[Vol. 9

ries of discussions with Swiss government and banking authorities resulting in a Memorandum of Understanding between the United States
and Switzerland.5 8 Under this Memorandum of Understanding, the
Enforcement Division and the Swiss bankers reached an accommodation as to the appropriate techniques of investigation for transactions
conducted in United States financial markets from Switzerland when
insider trading is suspected.' 59 This transition from the confrontational
techniques of Banco Della Svizzera Italiana and Santa Fe to the accommodations of the international agreement was the first of two categorical solutions the SEC proposed to resolve its conflicts with bank
secrecy. The second was to propose a general waiver of bank secrecy.
D.

Waivers of Secrecy

One means of obtaining information under most bank secrecy laws
is procuring the consent of the bank customer. Most bank secrecy statutes and cases explicitly recognize that customer consent, either express or implied, is an exception to the banker's obligations of confidentiality. The earliest American cases recognized that obtaining
waivers of bank secrecy was an appropriate technique for reconciling
the differences between American discovery and foreign privacy laws.
For example, in Rogers, 60 it was one of the techniques used by the
Swiss plaintiff to partially comply with the discovery demands.' 6'
United States litigants were quick to see the advantages of customer
consent, and, in a number of instances, such waivers were obtained on
a voluntary basis. In other cases, parties subject to the court's jurisdiction were ordered to execute waivers of the foreign secrecy provisions. 6' The propriety of this technique for compelling waivers of foreign secrecy was rarely examined by United States courts, and when it
was addressed, the courts only considered whether such compelled
waivers constituted a violation of the American constitutional precepts
against self-incrimination. 63 For a bank, the primary advantage of a
compelled waiver is to focus the coercive force of the American court
on the customer of the bank rather than on the bank itself. Courts in
158. Memorandum of Understanding for International Law Enforcement of Insider
Trading, Aug. 31, 1982, United States-Switzerland, reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 1 (1982).
159 Id.
160. Societe Internationale pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v.
Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
161. Id.
162. United States v. Davis, 767 F.2d 1025 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Ghidoni,
732 F.2d 814 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 932 (1984); United States v. Quigg, 48
A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 5953 (D. Va. 1981).
163. 767 F.2d at 1025; 732 F.2d at 814.
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secrecy jurisdictions recognize the legitimacy of requiring a party, who
voluntarily enters into litigation in the United States, to furnish the
United States courts with all relevant information. On occasion they
have lifted bank secrecy to ensure that result.164 In circumstances
where the party did not voluntarily submit to the court's jurisdiction,
however, they found a compelled waiver to be a travesty of justice
since these courts do not consider a compelled waiver to constitute a
1 65
true waiver within the meaning of the secrecy jurisdiction legislation.
The SEC, in an attempt to extrapolate from its experiences in
Banco Della Svizzera Italiana, Santa Fe, and the decisions on waiver
of foreign secrecy provisions, proposed a concept referred to as "waiver
by conduct." 1 " Under this concept, if a foreigner chose to trade in securities listed on an American exchange, that conduct would be
deemed to be a waiver of any foreign bank secrecy to the extent necessary to permit investigations by the SEC of any violations arising out
of such trading. 6 ' When the Enforcement Division of the SEC proposed this change of regulations, it engendered substantial protest
from securities regulators, bankers and foreign governments. " One objection asserted was that this procedure represented another unilateral
attempt by the United States to impose its views as to discovery and
investigation on the world without consulting the governments involved in imposing the original restrictions. 6 9 Apparently responding
to the protests, the SEC did not pursue its "waiver by conduct" proposal, but built upon its Swiss experience by negotiating a series of bilateral executive agreements.
The SEC experience of first obtaining information through coercive means against banks, then proposing "waiver by conduct," and
ultimately negotiating bilateral agreements, generally reflects the
United States' experience. With increased sophistication and experience, the SEC found coercive means less effective than international
agreements.
E. Effects of Increased Sophistication
The SEC's example of entering into bilateral Memoranda of Understanding is the simplest example of a complex process by which
164. Int'l Bank of Washington v. Cross, No. 38, Equity Side (Bahamas 1980).
165: In re ABC, No. 269 (Cayman Is. 1984).
166. Requests for Comments on Waiver by Conduct, Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 21,186, 16 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 31, at 1305 (July 30, 1984).
167. Id.
168. Waiver by Conduct Proposal Meets Strong Wave of Foreign, U.S. Opposition, 17
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 7, at 291 (Feb. 15, 1985).
169. Id. at 292-93 (comments by Swiss Bankers Association).
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American investigative and litigation techniques have evolved and developed to accommodate both free-wheeling United States discovery
and foreign financial privacy. The sequence of evolution can be seen in
a number of examples. First, there is a confrontation over the apparently irreconcilable differences between American desires for information and foreign strictures on privacy. This can be seen in cases where
parties subject to American jurisdiction were confronted with conflicting demands of foreign secrecy and United States discovery. These
conflicting demands arose in the shipping cartel cases, 7 ' the atomic
energy cases, 171 the various Swiss criminal investigations,' 7 and the recent money laundering cases, primarily in the Eleventh Circuit.17 3 In
each case, an investigator, whose central focus was not on the gathering
of information from abroad but was instead on putting together a case,
one element of which included foreign discovery, turned to familiar coercive techniques when faced with an obstinate refusal to provide information. Coercive efforts, while often successful in the end, were
costly and diverted the investigator from the primary goal.1 7 4 As these
litigations became more frequent, the United States government began
to develop and centralize its expertise in foreign discovery. First, the
Justice Department created the Office of International Affairs. Thereafter, the SEC created an Office of International Counsel, and finally,
the Internal Revenue Service created a special division of the General
Counsel's Office. In each instance, the result has been to centralize
within the bureaucracy the otherwise disparate foreign discovery
requests.

17 1

The effect of this centralization can clearly be seen in the SEC's
progression from the coercion of Banco Della Svizzera Italiana and
Santa Fe, to the unilateral "waiver by conduct," to a series of bilateral
agreements.
The Justice Department has followed a similar course by developing a series of judicial assistance treaties. The first, with the Swiss, was
170. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation of the Shipping Indus., 186 F. Supp.
298 (D.D.C. 1960).
171. See, e.g., Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., [1978] 2 W.L.R. 81.
172. See, e.g., In re Marc Rich & Co., 736 F.2d 864 (2d Cir. 1984).
173. United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d 1384 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1119 (1983); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (United States v. Field), 532
F.2d 404 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976).
174. Fedders & Wade, supra note 89, at 9; CismE & SEcREcY, supra note 2, at 127.
175. See, e.g., Letter to all U.S. District Attorneys from D. Lowell Jensen, Associate
Attorney General, regarding Subpoenas to Obtain Records Located in Foreign Countries
for Use in Criminal Cases, reprinted in Bschoor, Waiver by Conduct: Another View, 6 J.
COMP. Bus. & CAP. MKT. L. 313 (1984).
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negotiated and ratified over a period of time.176 Now the United States
also has treaties with Canada and the Cayman Islands."'
With respect to civil discovery, the United States is a signatory to
the Hague Convention. Although the issue of whether the convention is
the exclusive means of foreign discovery is unresolved (there are a
number of countries that have taken a reservation with respect to pretrial discovery techniques), the Hague Convention presents an important means for mediating between American demands for discovery
and foreign privacy concepts. 78 Finally, in efforts to revise our tax
treaties and as part of the Caribbean Basin Initiative, the United
States has entered into a number of agreements to facilitate the obtaining of income tax information from foreign secrecy jurisdictions,
such as Bermuda.""
These treaty arrangements offer the greatest promise for an effective resolution of the conflicts between American notions of inquiry
and foreign privacy provisions. While conflicts have often arisen
through inadvertence or non-substantive differences, such as sloppy
searches or a party's bad faith, there are some fundamental cultural
differences, particularly with respect to the nature of judicial versus
party fact-gathering, which cannot be bridged except through negotiated resolution in advance of specific cases.
VI.

CONCLUSION

American inquiries into information protected by foreign secrecy
laws have produced a history of conflict and coercion. There has been
only limited recognition of the fundamental similarities between American and foreign notions of financial privacy and the proper exceptions
imposed on that confidence. When United States bank secrecy is examined, one can readily see the similarities between American and for176. Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, May 25, 1973, United States-Switzerland, 27 U.S.T. 2019, T.I.A.S. No. 8302, at 1.
177. Treaty Concerning the Cayman Islands and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, July 3, 1986, United Kingdom-United States, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 537;
Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Mar. 18, 1985, Canada-United
States, reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1092.
178. Heck, U.S. Misinterpretationof the Hague Evidence Convention, 24 COLUM. J.
ComP. L. 231 (1986); Maier, ExtraterritorialDiscovery: Cooperation, Coercion and the
Hague Evidence Convention, 19 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 239 (1986); Comment, Interna-

tional Discovery American-Style, and the Hague Evidence Convention, 19 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 87 (1986).

179. Convention Relating to the Taxation of Insurance Enterprises and Mutual Assistance in Tax Matters, July 11, 1986, United States-United Kingdom, reprinted in 20
INTERNATIONAL TAX TREATIES OF ALL NATIONS 355 (W. Diamond & D. Diamond eds.
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eign notions of the doctrine. Moreover, an examination of the exceptions to the doctrine suggests that American financial privacy concepts
are not so far from foreign concepts as is often believed. A history of
American discovery and investigative cases about foreign bank secrecy
suggests, however, that the similarities are rarely appreciated.
Problems inherent in specific cases, such as misunderstandings or lack
of sophistication, often trigger conflicts that widen the gulf between
the United States and other countries on these issues. Recent efforts,
particularly the federal government's attempts to enter into bilateral
and multilateral arrangements, arose primarily from the recognition of
the similarities between the United States and other financial centers.
This recognition should allow us to meet the need for more efficient,
less confrontational methods to exchange information, a need intensified by the increasingly world-wide market for goods and services.
While the opportunities for misunderstanding are still substantial, the
proliferation of arrangements for the exchange of civil and criminal information should significantly reduce the frequency of misunderstandings and confrontations.

